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I. INTRODUCTION
“As goes Ohio, so goes the nation.”1 In recent years, significant attention has
been paid to elections in Ohio. In 2004, the eyes of the world focused on Ohio as the
presidential election nearly went to a recount reminiscent of Florida in 2000 because
Ohio was unable to declare a winner. In 2008, not long after Ohio was called for
then Senator Barack Obama, the television commentators recognized that Senator
1
The original phrase is in reference to another state: “As Maine goes, so goes the
country.” ROBERT W. SPEEL, CHANGING PATTERNS OF VOTING IN THE NORTHERN UNITED
STATES: ELECTORAL REALIGNMENT 1952-1996, at 19 (1998) (citing HENRY F. WOODS,
AMERICAN SAYINGS 109 (1945)). Until 1960, Maine held its elections in September, two
months before the rest of the country. Ken Rudin, The Significance of the V.P. Pick,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM (July 14, 2000), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
campaigns/junkie/archive/junkie071400.htm. Therefore, the phrase only referred to the fact
that Maine voted months before anyone else. Id. The Ohio-centric turn of phrase seems to
have begun appearing during the 2004 presidential election as the outcome of that national
election was completely dependent on the outcome of Ohio’s election. As Ohio has been a
perpetual presidential swing state since the 2004 election, the phrase stuck. See generally Kate
Snow, As Ohio Goes, So Goes the Nation . . . Again, ABC NEWS (Nov. 6, 2007), http://
abcnews.go.com/WN/Vote2008/story?id=3826822; As Ohio Goes, So Goes The Nation.
Sometimes., WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Mar. 6, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2008/03/05/AR2008030503510.html; Zak Lutz, So Goes Ohio, So Goes the
Nation, HARVARD UNIV. INSTITUTE OF POLITICS (2012), http://www.iop.harvard.edu/so-goesohio-so-goes-nation.
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John McCain would not be able to overcome Senator Obama’s Electoral College
lead, thereby projecting Senator Obama would win the presidency.2 This pattern
repeated in 2012 where, within seconds of calling Ohio for President Obama, the
media declared he had won re-election. 3
In all three elections, the country was able to avoid an electoral meltdown in part
because Ohio was able to count votes in short order. However, each of the elections
demonstrated to the world the susceptibility of elections that hinge upon the
mechanisms and methods in place to determine what cast ballots are to be counted.
Since the 2000 election, the mechanism of elections has been subject to review by
scholars, lawmakers, advocates, and in many cases federal courts. The continual
change in and review of election systems have not overcome the reality that elections
systems, including Ohio’s system, could not weather a close or controversial election
without delay, litigation, or doubt as to the result.4 If such a conflict would arise, the
actions taken in polling places across the state could be critical in determining a
victor within the state and possibly the nation.
Ohio, like many states, has responded to this circumstance with an incredibly
technical and rule driven approach to election administration.5 This approach to
elections administration is deficient for two primary reasons: (1) it refuses to accept
that mistakes happen, and (2) the only mistakes that are subject to scrutiny are those
that leave a sufficient paper trail that they could be subject to litigation or postelection scrutiny. This Article presents an analysis of Election Day error in Ohio's
2012 general election through a discussion of the materiality principle, compliance
standards, and the Democracy Canon, and suggests that a hybrid approach to
election administration is necessary for Ohio’s General Assembly and election
administrators at every level to better identify those mistakes and incorporate realtime mistake remedies into Election Day procedures. Ultimately, the human factor of
elections should be recognized as an opportunity for better voter understanding and
participation rather than a barrier in the pursuit of a perfect Election Day.

2
Joe Scarborough, live on MSNBC after calling Ohio for Obama, stated, “[W]e don’t
want to call it. There are still people on the West Coast that have to vote, but I just don’t see
any pathway . . . [for McCain victory].” MSNBC television broadcast Nov. 4, 2008.
3

Brett Baier, after declaring Ohio for President Obama, said, “That’s the presidency . . .
essentially, Barack Obama is re-elected.” FOX News television broadcast Nov. 6, 2012.
Rachel Maddow on MSNBC said, “[W]e have just learned that in the state of Ohio, NBC
News has projected that President Obama has won the state of Ohio. President Obama has
been re-elected for a second term.” MSNBC television broadcast Nov. 6, 2012. Wolf Blitzer
said, “CNN projects that Barack Obama will be re-elected President of the United States. He
will remain in the White House for another four years because we project that he will carry the
state of Ohio. By carrying Ohio, he wins the election for President of the United States.” CNN
television broadcast Nov. 6, 2012.
4
Edward B. Foley, Numbers Show Ohio at Unique Risk of Disputed Presidential Votes,
ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (Dec. 17, 2012), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/
index.php?ID=10289.
5

For example, the Ohio Secretary of State provides training and manuals. See Elections
& Voting, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/elections
officials/electOffPubs/general.aspx (including, for example, a 998 page “Election Official
Manual” and 58 directives issued in 2012).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. A review of the Materiality Principle, compliance standards, and Democracy
Canon are critical in order to propose an election system for Ohio in the wake of the
November 2012 election that accounts for the Election Day experience.
A review of literature on remediation of election error uncovers scholarship
primarily addressing issues after elections and how to reduce the frequency and costs
associated with recounts and litigation.6 In order to address and accommodate the
issues of election error and constructing a fairer system of addressing Election Day
error, we must examine the concepts guiding election error generally and apply them
to issues at the point of voting.
1. Materiality Principle
In Resolving Election Error: Dynamic Assessment of Materiality, Justin Levitt
argues that “materiality” to voter eligibility should be the standard when determining
whether a ballot should be rejected because of error.7 The author notes two parts to
materiality: (1) significant mistake to a requirement that is irrelevant to determining
voter eligibility is not material, and (2) irrelevant mistake to provision necessary to
determine voter eligibility is not material.8 Materiality is dynamic: what is material
today may be immaterial tomorrow, and what is immaterial today may be material
tomorrow.9 Under the materiality standard, votes should be counted so long as no
reasonable decision maker would have a substantial question about either the voter's
eligibility or the voter's ballot preference.10 The Materiality Principle does not
demand incremental procedures “to seek information bearing on the validity of a
vote; it merely changes the standard by which votes are evaluated when there is
cause to undertake an evaluation.”11 Levitt argues that this standard is no more
subject to substantial bias than any other standard that has been proposed or is in
use.12 Levitt notes both the legislatively created “election regulations are to be
constructed liberally in favor of the voter” and the judicial “substantial compliance”

6
One exception to this general standard relates to ballot design. Election officials have
shown a willingness to recognize and mitigate mistakes caused by how voters interact with a
ballot. See Mary Beth Beazley, Ballot Design as Fail-Safe: An Ounce of Rotation is Worth a
Pound of Litigation, 12 ELECTION L.J. 18 (2013). Attention to ballot design concerns is similar
to pre- and post-election challenges in the existence of a clear evidentiary record and items
that can be assessed and modified outside of the strict time limitations of Election Day.
7
Justin Levitt, Resolving Election Error: The Dynamic Assessment of Materiality, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 83, 103 (2012).
8

See id. at 108.

9

Id. at 113.

10

Id. at 123.

11

Id. at 123-24.

12

Id. at 138.
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approach as flexible standards that leave similar option for bias as the Materiality
Principle.13
2. Compliance Standards
Edward Foley’s How Fair Can Be Faster: the Lessons of Coleman v. Franken,
examines the concept of fair elections and vote counting through the lens of the 2008
Minnesota Senate election and recount.14 This Article proposes a model calendar for
the duration of seven weeks for major election recounts, and describes the creation
and implementation of an impartial tribunal.15 It also argues that a fair
tribunal/process is more important than having ideal rules for vote-counting.16 Foley
describes three vote-counting regimes, noting that constructive compliance seems
intuitively superior to a harsh strict compliance regime.17 First he discusses the strict
compliance standard under which only ballots free from error and cast in strict
compliance with election laws can be counted, even when the deviation from law is
due to official error.18 The second standard Foley explains is substantial compliance,
wherein ballots with some errors can be counted, even if the errors are caused by the
voter, because the ballot is in substantial compliance with the law.19 Finally, he
discusses the concept of constructive compliance, where a voter constructively
complies with the law when she does everything she can to comply with the election
laws, but an election official makes an error causing the ballot to no longer comply
with the law.20 These ballots may be counted, but ballots with voter-caused error
may not.21 Foley concludes that because state election laws and relevant case law are
rarely clear on the choice between vote-counting regimes, an impartial tribunal to
select the proper vote counting doctrine is more important to fairness than picking
the ‘correct’ vote-counting method.22
3. The Democracy Canon and Alternatives
Richard Hasen, in The Democracy Canon, describes the Democracy Canon as a
substantive canon of statutory interpretation that says ambiguous election laws
should be liberally construed in favor of the voter.23 The Canon has a longstanding
13

Id. at 99. In Ohio, this balancing approach is seen by both a general statement that a
vote should count if intent is clear and in rulings in the NEOCH v. Husted case, discussed in
detail below through use of a fault-based analysis.
14

Edward Foley, How Fair Can Be Faster: the Lessons of Coleman v. Franken, 10
ELECTION L.J. 187 (2011), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/documents/hfcbf.
pdf.
15

Id. at 187, 198-99.

16

Id. at 216.

17

Id. at 217.

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id. at 218.

21

Id.

22

Id. at 219.

23

Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 77 (2009).
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history in state courts when deciding vote counting cases in which ballots are
disputed due to minor voter error, poll worker error, or a disputed reading of a
statute.24 Hasen shows that it applies when the election law is ambiguous, but
probably does not apply when the language of the statute is clear.25 The Democracy
Canon is different from other substantive canons because it helps enforce the right to
vote and, due to the political salience of elections policy, legislatures can overrule
what they see to be incorrect decisions of the courts by clarifying the law via
legislation (although this is only helpful to subsequent elections).26 Hasen argues that
the Democracy Canon is especially vulnerable to politicization, but consistent
application and attempts to educate the public about the history of the canon should
reduce the extent to which use of this canon is seen as a partisan move.27
The Democracy Canon has been subjected to significant critique. Christopher
Elmendorf's Refining the Democracy Canon, is a direct response and critique of
Hasen’s The Democracy Canon. Elmendorf is skeptical of the Democracy Canon
because of costs that may be associated with it.28 These costs are: (1) an increase in
the “partisan gap” in judicial rulings in election cases, undermining public
confidence in the neutrality of courts and election results, (2) a potential for
undermining incentives for bipartisan compromise on election issues, as thumbing
the scale in favor of one position could make the other side fight for tighter language
or prevent the legislation from passing, and (3) the possibility of displacing
important, non-election matters from the legislature’s agenda in order to correct a
judicial interpretation that does not comport with the legislature’s intention.29
Elemendorf proposes three other canons of interpretation that could be used in
place of the Democracy Canon: the Effective Accountability Canon, the Carrington
Canon, and the Neutrality Canon.30 An Effective Accountability Canon would
encompass a norm that says an election law, or suite of election laws, is
unconstitutional if there are practicable alternatives that would result in substantially
more effective accountability to the normative electorate at reasonable cost.31
Elmendorf argues this norm is embodied in the 17th Amendment32 and the
24

Id. at 76-80.

25

Id. at 88.

26

Id. at 97-102.

27

Id. at 106.

28

Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1051,
1056 (2010).
29

Id. at 1057.

30

Id. at 1055-56.

31

Id. at 1076-77.

32

The 17th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states:

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state,
elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The
electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most
numerous branch of the state legislatures. When vacancies happen in the
representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall
issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, that the legislature of any State
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Guarantee Clause33 of the U.S. Constitution and that under this standard of
interpretation, ambiguities in statutes should be resolved in favor of a reading that
helps the result of an election capture what the public “wanted” the result to be.34
The Carrington Canon35 would interpret election statutes narrowly when they are
passed on party lines and would remove or reverse the normal presumption of
deference to administrative agencies if the agency is partisan in structure.36 Finally,
the Neutrality Canon would construe election laws to avoid finding a private right of
action near the apex of an election cycle, convert vaguely worded statutory standards
into clear judicially constructed doctrines, presume that agencies charged with
administration of elections have authority to issue rules with the force of law, and
treat a bipartisan or difference-splitting interpretation as presumptively correct.37
4. Partisanship and Decentralization of Election Administration
The idea that rampant partisanship and a decentralization of election
administration have only exacerbated instances of and ineffective responses to
election error is discussed extensively in relevant literature.38 In Getting From Here
to There in Election Reform, Heather Gerken begins by describing numerous
instances of electoral error, from erroneously discarded ballots and long voting lines
to poorly trained poll workers and voting machine breakdowns. She also discusses
why electoral reform should be easy: there is a consensus that a problem exists,
numerous possible solutions have been proposed by legislators and academics,
may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people
fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. This amendment shall not
be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it
becomes valid as part of the Constitution.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. For Elmendorf, the requirement of direct election by the people
requires a canon of interpretation that prioritizes and gives deference to the intent of the voting
public. See Elmendorf, supra note 28, at 1077-78.
33
Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution states: “The United States shall guarantee
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
Elmendorf specifically argues that the Founding-era ideas of republican government
specifically references a no monarchial government through a “filtered-majoritarian system of
rule—one that provides for popular accountability while checking the citizenry’s passions and
naked self-interest.” Elmendorf, supra note 28, at 1078.
34

Elmendorf, supra note 28, at 1077-84.

35

The Canon is named after the Supreme Court case Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89
(1965). In Carrington, the Court held that denying someone access to the ballot based purely
upon the way they may vote is unconstitutional. Id. at 97.
36

Elmendorf, supra note 28, at 1095-97.

37

Id. at 1098-104.

38
Ohio is not immune to this trend. One of several examples from recent years was the
passage and later repeal of H.B. 194 (and the repealing act S.B. 224) during the 129th General
Assembly. See David Eggert, House Likely to Kill Elections Bill Targeted by Referendum,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/04/
25/house-likely-to-kill-elections-bill-targeted-by-referendum.html.
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elections are a salient and important issue, and several “crises” (namely Florida in
2000 and Ohio in 2004) that elevated election problems to national prominence have
occurred.39 However, Gerken notes that despite this environment ripe for reform,
little has been done because of partisan and decentralized control and administration
of elections.40 To overcome partisanship and localism, she suggests the creation and
design of a Democracy Index, similar to the way US News and World Report ranks
universities and colleges.41 The Democracy Index would include data on a number of
election issues: how many ballots were discarded, how long did voters wait in line,
how common were machine breakdowns, and others.42 This data-driven ranking
would enable states to see where they stack up and undertake reform (because no
one wants to be at the bottom), thus reducing impact of localism.43 The Index would
also enable voters to gauge the job the election officials in their state (including the
Secretary of State) are doing—something that is very difficult for most voters
without some sort of heuristic measure—thus reducing impact of partisan selfinterest.44 To some degree The Pew Charitable Trusts has implemented an index
similar to what Gerken proposes. Their Election Performance Index measures states
on 17 indicators to create an overall score; relevant to this Article, the indicators do
not attempt to measure mistake, but some indicators capture the result of mistakes
such as provisional ballots rejected, voting wait time, and disability- or illnessrelated voting problems.45
Richard Hasen also addresses the consequences of partisanship and decentralized
elections administration in Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S.
Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown. Due to hyper-partisanship,
decentralized election administration with patchwork application of rules,
administrator incompetence, technological advances, and voter error, the possibility
of “electoral meltdown”46 is becoming increasingly more likely.47 Hasen proposes
39

Heather K. Gerken, Getting From Here to There in Election Reform, 34 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 33, 36-38 (2009).
40
Id. at 38-39. Though neither squarely within Gerken’s analysis nor the scope of this
Article, it is imperative to note that before any sustained reform could be attempted, political
leaders need to reach some agreement as to the appropriate role of government in relation to
voting. For the record, it is the position of the authors that government at every level has an
obligation to not only regulate the franchise, but to encourage, promote, and protect exercise
of the right to vote at every level.
41

Id. at 39-40.

42

Id. at 40.

43

Id.

44

Id. at 44.

45

Elections Performance Index, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, http://www.pewstates.org/
research/data-visualizations/measuring-state-elections-performance-85899446194.
Ohio
ranked 40th at 64% for 2010 (the most recent data available). Id.
46

Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 938 (2005).
Hasen refers to the 2000 presidential election as the “first presidential meltdown” in recent
memory. Even though he declines to specifically define what constitutes an “electoral
meltdown,” his comments seem to suggest that a meltdown is characterized by vote totals
within the margin of litigation, thereby sending the election into court and leaving the public
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three reforms to reduce the risk of electoral meltdown: (1) registration reforms
including universal registration coupled with a national voter identification program,
(2) transition to nonpartisan election administration with nonpartisan chief elections
officers, and (3) more court willingness to entertain pre-election challenges and less
willingness with post-election litigation.48 Hasen's registration reform proposal
attempts to combine Republican policies (voter ID card with name, signature,
photograph, and fingerprints) with Democrat policies (universal registration).49 This
proposed reform suggests the federal government should be responsible for
implementing the voter identification cards and universal registration.50 Hasen also
proposes creating nonpartisan chief elections officers, appointed by the governor and
confirmed by a supermajority of the legislature.51 In order to ensure insulation from
political pressure, the officer would have a single long term, be removable only by
impeachment and be guaranteed sufficient funding in the state constitution.52 Lastly,
Hasen argues courts should be reluctant to hear post-election challenges when the
issue was foreseeable prior to the election, and should be more open to pre-election
challenges.53
B. A rigidly technical approach to election administration and mistake is
unnecessary since the Anderson-Burdick framework, as it has been applied within
the 6th Circuit, supports flexibility in election administration.
In Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. 428 (1992), the Court developed a balancing test which provides needed
guidance and flexibility for evaluation of election regulation.54 Any regulatory
burden on the right to vote must be justified by balancing state interest. The
balancing test established in Anderson requires a court to consider the nature and
size of the alleged injury, identify and evaluate the state interests in the regulation,
and determine “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the
plaintiff’s rights.”55 Applying this standard in Burdick, this Court found “the

with an indeterminate outcome for a period of time. These actions severely undermine the
public trust in election integrity, which create an “electoral meltdown” in a democratic
society.
47

Id. at 944.

48

Id. at 945-46.

49

Id. at 969-72.

50

Id. at 972-73.

51

Id. at 983-85.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 991.

54

The following analysis of Anderson and Burdick is adapted from and expands on the
amicus brief in favor of respondents filed by author Kearney and drafted in part by authors
Parikh and Sanders, on behalf of the Senate Minority Caucus in Husted v. Obama for
America, 133 S. Ct. 497 (2012).
55

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
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rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon
the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens . . . rights.”56
There is no question that voting is a fundamental right. Any restriction on the
exercise of the franchise of voting “must be justified by relevant and legitimate state
interests ‘sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.’”57 States have an obligation
to regulate elections and voting to facilitate the democratic process. “States may not
casually deprive a class of individuals of the vote because of some remote
administrative benefit to the State.”58 As a result, states have developed complex
election regulations and codes. The Court has acknowledged that
[e]ach provision of these schemes, whether it governs the registration and
qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the
voting process itself, inevitably affects—at least to some degree—the
individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with others for political
ends. Nevertheless, the State’s important regulatory interests are generally
sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.59
The Anderson/Burdick standard was relied upon and ultimately strengthened
during litigation in the fall of 2012. It has been proposed, particularly by Richard
Hasen that the use of Bush v. Gore in combination with the existing balancing
framework “reflect a broader change in the circuit’s view of election administration
cases and the precedential value of the controversial 2000 Supreme Court Case.”60
This same type of voter focused balancing could be incredibly effective in
approaching mistake.
As with all balanced based standards, the Anderson/Burdick balancing standard is
flexible. Through not prescribing any one requirement, it supports a range of options
for states for the management of the electoral process. The Anderson/Burdick
standard is also compatible with the Democracy Canon and the Materiality Principle.
The Democracy Canon supports facilitating voting, emphasizing the right to vote
when weighing regulation against it. The Materiality Principle especially through its
dynamic response to errors provides a means of regulating with the least possible
restriction on the right to vote.61 It rejects an overly technical approach, also
embodied in the materiality principle, to election administration to the extent that
such an approach unduly burdens voters compared to the state interest. Although it
has not typically been applied in such a manner, the standard would permit an
election administration mechanism that, in order to minimize a burden on the voter,
permitted flexibility and avoided a search for perfection. Such flexibility was
56

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).

57

Crawford v Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008) (quoting Norman v.
Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992)).
58

Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (internal citations omitted).

59

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.

60

Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of
Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1865, 1893 (2012).
61
In this respect the materiality principle is similar to Foley’s substantial compliance
standard balancing regulatory need versus a human evaluation of whether a vote “should”
count.
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embraced as a tool to fight discrimination, such as through the Civil Rights Act it
became unlawful to deny the right to vote in a federal election due to an immaterial
mistake.62 This standard could be utilized as a mechanism to establish Election Day
procedures that do not rely solely on setting out the means of holding elections, but
make an affirmative statement that the purpose of elections is to record and reflect
the will of the voters.
C. Past litigation reveals a clear record of mistakes on Election Day, which
inconsistently affect ballot inclusion.
Evidence from past litigation demonstrates that issues at the polls exist and have
persisted from previous elections. A review of pleadings from election related
litigation63 shows 10 discreet types of error that have existed in Ohio election
administration and for which there is no evidence to demonstrate the absence of
these errors in the November 2012 election.64 The 10 types of error are: (1) general
poll worker error; (2) right location-wrong precinct error; (3) failure to record
information; (4) failure to make accommodation for disabilities or health problems;
(5) failure to direct voters at all; (6) failure to instruct voters properly on how to
complete a ballot; (7) failure to correctly handle properly completed ballots; (8)
general voter error; (9) error in poll workers’ materials; and (10) errors in preparing
election materials.
1. General Poll Worker Error
In the March 2012 Primary Election, there was evidence of general poll worker
error. According to the minutes of the Butler County Board of Elections, poll worker
training was one of the issues:
The problems we saw on Election Day with our Provisional table were
due to poll workers not being adequately trained on processing
Provisional Voters on the Electronic Poll Books. . . . The suggestion was
made to place an additional person at the Provisional Table to guide
voters.65

62

(2) No person acting under color of law shall—
(B) deny the right of any individual to vote in any Federal election because of an error
or omission on any record or paper relating to any application, registration, or other
act requisite to voting, if such error or omission is not material in determining whether
such individual is qualified under State law to vote in such election . . . .
Civil Rights Act of 1964, sec. 101, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
63
See, e.g., Northeast Ohio Coalition for Homeless (NEOCH) v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580
(6th Cir. 2012); Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 1 (SEIU) v. Husted, 698 F.3d 341 (6th Cir.
2012); Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 2011).
64

Id.

65

Butler County Board of Elections Board Meeting Minutes from Mar. 21, 2012, at
PageID No. 8738, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896,
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsA-M.pdf, at
101.
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In Franklin County in 2010, the Board recognized that given the structure of the
administration of the elections on a poll location level, there were significant and
pervasive errors undoubtedly due to poll worker error.66 Even worse, after the March
2012 primary election in Trumbull County, the Board rejected all wrong precinct
ballots, even though the Board noted that these errors were caused by poll workers.67
These errors were nothing new. In the November 2006 election, Dora Rose, the
organizer of voter protection in Cuyahoga County for the Democratic Party,
observed the vote count at the Cuyahoga County Board of Election.68 She reported
that provisional ballots with no birth dates were put into a rejected pile, ballots
without addresses were put into a rejected pile, there were written instructions for
workers to eliminate the 10 day return recourse for voters who could not remember
the last four digits of their social security number, and no ballots were marked for a
10-day hold—all in violation of Ohio election law.69 In 2008, the Scioto County
Board of Elections “remade” 21 provisional ballots that were completed incorrectly
due to poll worker error.70 In 2010 in Hocking County, the Board of Elections
acknowledged that some voters were given the wrong ballot because of poll worker
error.71 Despite efforts to train poll workers, errors continued to occur in the election
process in Montgomery County. The Director of the Board of Elections stated that
“even with training our pollworkers we have had many mistakes on Election Day
with the provisional votes.”72

66

“[W]here there’s a single table and a single set of poll workers assigned to the task of
provisional ballots for all the precincts in a location, it would be pretty difficult in this county
to conceive of a situation where it would be a voter error.” Franklin County Board of
Elections Special Meeting Transcript from Nov. 19, 2010, at PageID No. 8812, NEOCH v.
Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.
edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsN-Z.pdf, at 20.
67

Trumbull County Board of Elections Board Meeting Minutes from Mar. 16, 2012, at
PageID No. 9022, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896,
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsAA-MM.pdf,
at 1.
68

Declaration of Dora Rose, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06cv-00896, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/NEOCH
%20Motion%20to%20Enforce%20Consent%20Order%20Exhibit%20D.pdf.
69

Id.

70

Scioto County Board of Elections Meeting Minutes from Nov. 4, 2008, at PageID No.
8959, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsAA-MM.pdf, at 26.
71
Hocking County Board of Elections Meeting Minutes from Nov. 18, 2010, at PageID
No. 8916-17, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available
at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsN-Z.pdf, at 119-20.
72

Reply Declaration of Cathrine J. Harshman, at PageID No. 10506, NEOCH v. Husted,
696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/
electionlaw/litigation/documents/DeclarationofCathrineJHarshman_000.pdf, at 7 (quoting
Montgomery County Board of Elections Meeting Minutes from Nov. 1, 2010).
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2. Right Location, Wrong Precinct
One of the most prominent issues at the polls is the right location-wrong precinct
problem. The problem can have many different causes, but some locations noticed
significant issues due to poor staffing. During the 2010 election in Franklin County,
Board of Elections staff explained that in at least one multi-precinct location, there
“is a single table and a single set of poll workers assigned to the task of provisional
ballots for all the precincts in a location [and] it would be pretty difficult in this
county to conceive of a situation where it would be a voter error.”73 Because there is
only one poll worker for provisional ballots, if a provisional ballot is cast in the
wrong precinct, then the poll worker is almost certainly blameworthy. In Hamilton
County during the March 2012 election, a ballot contained a conflict in the voter’s
address. However, one of the addresses was actually the poll worker’s address, and
the address was handwritten in another color of ink. Despite this strong indication of
poll worker error, the Board refused to find that there was poll worker error and the
ballot was not counted.74 In 2008 in Franklin County, a member of the Board of
Elections described a specific instance of poll worker75 error that he observed, when
a poll worker told the voter to go to the wrong precinct:
I saw a woman that was in the right precinct but her driver’s license had a
different address on it, and they told her to go to another precinct. And
she went to the other precinct, and when she went to the other precinct
they had her in the books there, but she said, I don’t live here. And so they
said, well, you can vote here. And then she was smart enough to come
back to the precinct that she was at, but had she not come back, she would
have voted in the wrong precinct, and being directed to vote in the wrong
precinct by our poll workers. So I see where this would be a situation that
we ought to at least take into consideration.76
These right location-wrong precinct problems are legion, and have become even
more common through consolidation of polling locations in recent years. In March
2012, the Ross County Board of Elections voted to reject three provisional ballots
that were cast in the correct location, but the wrong precinct due clearly to poll
73
Franklin County Board of Elections Special Meeting Transcript from Nov. 19, 2010, at
PageID No. 8812, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896,
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsN-Z.pdf, at 20.
74
Hamilton County Board of Elections Meeting Transcript from Apr. 25, 2012, at PageID
No. 8864-65, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available
at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsN-Z.pdf, at 67-68.
75

Under Ohio law, precinct officials are formally called “judges of election” with the
official in charge at a precinct titled the “presiding judge.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.22
(LexisNexis 2014). Increasingly, in manuals and training these workers are described as
“precinct election officials” and a presiding judge often names a “voting location manager”
for multiple-precinct locations. As is shown in the evidence and depositions reviewed in this
section, the term “poll worker” is still commonly used and will be used throughout this
Article, though there will also be references to a “presiding judge” where appropriate.
76
Franklin County Board of Elections Special Meeting from Nov. 14, 2008, at PageID
No. 8844-45, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available
at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsN-Z.pdf, at 47-48.
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worker error. The Board considered the fact that the ballot was cast in the wrong
precinct, but the Board decided to reject the ballot anyway. Before the motion to
reject the ballots was carried, one membered explained:
[T]hese were done at the polling place and they actually went to the
correct polling place but the polling place has maybe two or three
different precincts in it. They went to the wrong table and the poll worker
is not supposed to vote them unless they’re in their book and if they’re not
in their book, they’re supposed to call us to see what precinct to send
them to. They didn’t. They just voted them on a provisional ballot.
The Board then rejected the ballots.77
3. Failure to Record Information
In March 2012, Butler County Board of Elections noticed record keeping
problems with provisional ballots as "there is no way to differentiate which poll
worker . . . processed the provisional ballot. Each location had a minimum of one
poll worker processing provisional ballots incorrectly . . . ."78 Record keeping issues
were also prevalent in the November 2008 Election in Adams County, especially in
Bratton and Winchester Townships.79
4. Failure to Make Accommodations for Disabilities or Health Problems
Poll workers are required to make certain reasonable accommodations to voters
with disabilities or health problems.80 However, these standards are not applied
evenly or correctly. In the March 2012 election in Franklin County, if the Board of
Elections determined that a signature voter’s signature was different any notes or
information from poll workers regarding any apparent illness or injury would be
considered.81 However, if the poll worker does not give the voter an opportunity to
explain the reason for the change, then the Board of Elections will not make any
77

Ross County Board of Elections Board Meeting from Mar. 21, 2012, at PageID No.
8950, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsAA-MM.pdf, at 17.
78
Butler County Board of Elections Board Meeting Minutes from Mar. 19, 2012, at
PageID No. 8747, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896,
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsA-M.pdf, at
110.
79

“Bratton Township books were not well maintained. The pollworkers did not document
clearly how some voters chose to vote, whether paper or machine as well as did not do
Provisionals correctly. Winchester Township pollworkers neglected to write down 11 voter
names in the pollbook.” Adams County Board of Elections Meeting Minutes from Nov. 19,
2008, at PageId No. 8718, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv00896, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsAM.pdf, at 81.
80

Myths about Voting and Voters with Disabilities, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, http://
www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/Voters/voterswithdisabilities/ADAmyths.aspx.
81
Franklin County Board of Elections Special Meeting Mar. 19, 2012, at PageID No.
8788, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsA-M.pdf, at 151.
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future contact with the voter to determine whether the change in signature was
caused by a medical condition.82
5. Failure to Direct Voters at All
Clinton and Clermont Counties’ poll workers struggled with providing voters
with even the most basic information at times. In 2010, the Clermont County Board
of Elections noted that there were voters “going from precinct to precinct to find
their locale with workers not checking [a] street guide.”83 In Clinton County in 2012,
the Board of Elections noted multiple instances of deficient/erroneous signage at
polling locations that led to significant confusion amongst voters.84 Yet, this may
have been seen as an improvement on Clinton County in 2008 where it was
discovered that especially in multi-precinct locations there was a complete lack of
overall instruction.85
6. Failure to Instruct Voters Properly on How to Complete a Ballot
There are numerous examples of poll workers failing to complete provisional
ballot paperwork correctly.86 Throughout the state, poll workers placed provisional
ballots in the wrong envelopes and failed to sign provisional ballot envelopes.87 In
Stark County in 2010, one precinct was described as “messed up” as “[p]oll workers
had provisional voters fill out provisional envelope but placed voted ballot in a
privacy envelope.”88
7. Failure to Handle Properly Completed Ballots
In Hamilton County in 2010, poll workers placed ballots in the wrong piles. Even
though voters submitted ballots for the correct precinct, poll workers improperly put
the ballots in the pile of “wrong precinct” ballots.89
82

Id.

83

Clermont County Record of Problem Sheet from Nov. 2, 2010, at PageID No. 9088,
NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at http://
moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsNN-PP.pdf, at 49.
84
Examples include: “Need a sign stating 2A voting Osborn Rm. w/ arrow pointing in
right direction.”; “Need a sign stating—1A Voting Community Rm.”; “Want blue and white
and table signs that say Village of Midland.” Second Supplemental Reply Declaration of
Daniel Miller, at PageID No. 5560, SEIU v. Husted, 698 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:12cv-00562,
available
at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/
SEIUSEcondSupplementalDeclarationofDanielBMiller.pdf, at 5.
85

Id.

86

Declaration of Daniel B. Miller in Support of Motion to Modify, at PageID No. 863133, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/DeclarationofDanielBMillerinSupp
ortofMotiontoModify.pdf, at 32-34.
87

Id. at 33.

88

Id. at 34.

89

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Preliminary
Injunction, at PageID No. 1378, Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219 (6th
Cir. 2011), No. 1:10-cv-00820, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/
documents/Hunter-Order-1-12-11.pdf, at 4.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

15

294

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:279

8. General Voter Error
In March 2012, the Huron County Board of Elections actually rejected a ballot
because the voter signed his or her name at the top of an envelope rather than
printing the name. The Board rejected the provisional ballot “because the voter
signed their name at the top of the envelope instead of printing it. The Director
contacted the Secretary of State for an opinion on this error and was advised by them
that it is a fatal error.”90 In Mercer County, the Board of Elections rejected a
provisional ballot because the voter voted in the wrong precinct, even though there
was no indication that it was the voter’s fault.91 Because there was no indication of
poll worker error, the Board attributed the error to the voter.92
9. Error in Poll Workers’ Materials
In counties throughout the state, poll workers’ materials were deficient as well.
In 2010 in Hamilton County, the Board of Elections found that poll workers
struggled to use street lists correctly, especially when odd and even street numbers
made the difference between precincts.93 There are also numerous statewide
examples of addresses not appearing in poll books94, streets being confusingly
organized in poll books,95 and electronic polls books with deficient designations of
precincts.96

90
Huron County Board of Election Meeting Minutes of Mar. 20, 2012, at PageID No.
8919, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsN-Z.pdf, at 122.
91

The authors reject the notion that fault should be the measure by which ballots are
evaluated, as will be explained more thoroughly below, but reference here to the purported
“fault” was considered appropriate as it framed the decision of the Board at the time.
92

Supplemental Reply Declaration of Daniel B. Miller, at PageID No. 4234 ¶ 12, SEIU v.
Husted, 698 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:12-cv-00562, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.
edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/SEIUAffidavitofDanielBMiller.pdf, at 5 (citing Mercer
County Board of Election Meeting Minutes from Mar. 20, 2012, Exhibit H at 2).
93

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Preliminary
Injunction, at PageID No. 1378, Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219 (6th
Cir. 2011), No. 1:10-cv-00820, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/
documents/Hunter-Order-1-12-11.pdf, at 4.
94

“Voter’s ‘new address is not listed in book of street guide[.]’ (Franklin County 2011)
(Ex. SS at 13).” Declaration of Daniel B. Miller, at PageID No. 8628, NEOCH v. Husted, 696
F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election
law/litigation/documents/DeclarationofDanielBMillerinSupportofMotiontoModify.pdf, at 29.
95
“’Voter’s address did not appear in the proper place in the CWSRG. ‘East Maple’
address in on[e] range was listed under ‘E’. Neighboring addresses were under ‘M[.]’ [P]wers
were able to locate the address using another Precinct’s EP unit.’ (Stark County 2012) (Ex.
WW at 3).” Id.
96
“’The E-Books (computer) indicates voters’ Precinct as ‘3’ only, & does not specify ‘A’
or ‘B.’ Both HUB-3A and HUB-3B are in the same polling location. We’ve found that voters’
names are appearing on Both computers.’ (Montgomery County 2012) (Ex. UU at 3).” Id.
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10. Errors in Preparing Election Materials
During the March 2012 Primary Election in Lorain County, the Board of
Elections minutes described the decision to reject ballots that were not properly
completed regardless of error. New ballot envelopes put out by the Secretary of State
required information on two sides of the form, but
[t]he Secretary of State’s office has confirmed that required information,
printed name, identification and a signature must be placed on the front of
the provisional envelope. If this information is missing on the front of the
envelope, but appears on the back of the envelope, where a voter
registration form is provided, it cannot be counted.97
D. Public record and supplied data from Election Day show significant presence of
error at many levels.
1. Methodology and Sources of Data (Including Limitations)
The Boards of Elections were contacted in twenty-six Ohio counties to obtain
information regarding their acceptance of absentee and provisional ballots in an
effort to determine whether there were observable patterns in the evaluation of these
ballots by the county boards for the 2012 November Election.98 These twenty-six
counties were chosen to show a cross-section of Ohio as they represent the ten
counties with the highest rate of provisional vote acceptance,99 the ten counties with
the lowest rate of provisional vote acceptance,100 the three most populous counties,101
the three least populous counties,102 and four counties representing the median
population of the counties.103 There was overlap between the counties chosen by
population and those chosen by provisional acceptance rate resulting in a total of
twenty-six counties.104

97

Lorain County Board of Elections Meeting Minutes from Mar. 15, 2012, at PageID No.
8935, NEOCH v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012), No. 2:06-cv-00896, available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ExhibitsAA-MM.pdf, at 2.
98
Those counties were Carroll, Clark, Cuyahoga, Erie, Franklin, Gallia, Hamilton,
Hancock, Harrison, Hocking, Huron, Knox, Monroe, Morgan, Noble, Paulding, Pickaway,
Pike, Putnam, Richland, Seneca, Tuscarawas, Van Wert, Vinton, Wood, and Wyandot.
99
Those counties were Harrison, Hancock, Putnam, Erie, Van Wert, Tuscarawas, Pike,
Noble, Richland, and Wyandot. Provisional Ballot Report: November 6, 2012 General
Election, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE (2012), available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/
upload/elections/2012/gen/provisional.xlsx.
100
Those counties were Morgan, Hocking, Hamilton, Carroll, Gallia, Wood, Paulding,
Franklin, Vinton, and Clark. Id.
101

Those counties were Cuyahoga, Franklin, and Hamilton. Population Projections:
County Totals, OHIO DEVELOPMENT SERVICES AGENCY (2013), available at http://
development.ohio.gov/files/research/P6090.pdf.
102

Those counties were Vinton, Monroe, and Noble. Id.

103

Those counties were Pickaway, Seneca, Huron, and Knox. Id.

104

Franklin, Hamilton, Noble, and Vinton Counties overlapped. Franklin and Hamilton
overlapped between the highest population and lowest provisional acceptance rate. Vinton
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The initial request to the county boards was for “the minutes of meetings wherein
[boards] determined how to process provisional ballots that may have included
incomplete or conflicting information as well as the minutes of meetings in which it
discussed how to process these ballots. Additionally . . . any memoranda or other
documents produced by the Board regarding the processing of these ballots or voting
irregularities (or on the interpretation of Secretary Husted's directive 2012-54)” were
requested.105 Any county that was non-responsive to the first request was contacted
again for the same request. All counties were generally responsive, with the
exception of Gallia County. The Gallia County Board of Elections never responded
to the public records requests made on February 12, 2013, March 6, 2013, and
March 26, 2013.106 In addition, Tuscarawas County was subject to an election
challenge so the records had been put under seal and therefore were not provided.107
Further, the forms submitted for absentee and provisional certifications were not
requested from the following counties: Clark, Erie, Hamilton, Huron, Knox, Monroe,
Noble, Paulding, Pike, Richland, Seneca, Tuscarawas, Van Wert, Wood, and
Wyandot and were therefore not received.108 Each county separately adjudicates why
ballots are rejected, there are differences in process and decision-making style
between counties regarding disqualification or acceptance of ballots as discussed
below. Nonetheless, the records were reviewed and the reasons for acceptance or
rejection of ballots were placed into a database to be analyzed.
In addition to requests to the Boards of Elections, requests were made to the
Secretary of State’s Office for incident information from voter
protection/information hotlines in operation on Election Day. Election Protection
managed by the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, a nonprofit
nonpartisan organization provided their Ohio call-in data as well.109
2. Evidence Collected from Governmental and Non-Partisan Voter Protection
Mechanisms
Call logs from the Ohio Secretary of State’s voter hotline and the non-partisan
Election Protection voter hotline yield valuable insight into the types of complaints
and issues that arise on Election Day while also highlighting the significant gaps in
available information. This information is significant as it reflects the breadth of
questions and concerns faced by voters, poll observers, and elections officials. It is
important to note the limited utility of this data as it is reported through self-selected
individuals who choose to call in without any means of verification, follow-up, or
contextual analysis.

overlapped between the lowest population and lowest provisional acceptance rate. Noble
overlapped between the lowest population and highest provisional acceptance rate. Id.
105

Copies of all requests and received information are maintained by the author.

106

Copies of these requests are maintained by the author.

107

A copy of the Tuscarawas County explanation of refusal is maintained by the author.

108

Copies of all requests and received information are maintained by the author.

109

A copy of this information is maintained by the author. Election Protection also makes
significant data available at http://www.866ourvote.org.
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i. Ohio Secretary of State Call Sheets
The Ohio Secretary of State maintained a voter hotline beginning on October 2,
2012 (the first day of early voting) and continuing through the day after Election
Day, November 7, 2012. Call center statistics compiled by the Secretary’s office
report a total of 16,929 calls received with 2,669 of those coming on Election Day.110
The line was staffed with Secretary of State employees on Election Day from 6 a.m.
until 8 p.m. For most of the day there were 12 staff members receiving calls at any
one time though it dipped as low as 10 during the lunch hour with only 6 from 7:30
p.m. to 8 p.m.111 The hotline staffers tracked call information on tally sheets.
Twenty-one tally sheets reflect calls received on Election Day and include a total of
2,219 calls.112
Calls could be recorded in one of nine categories: absentee ballot; registration;
polling location; fraud concerns; issues, candidates, etc.; UOCAVA (referring to the
Uniform and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act); Provisional ballot; campaign
finance; and Other.113 Only the “Other” section includes a prompt to specify the
nature of the call which is done by brief notes on the sheet itself. Occasionally,
additional notes are found on the tally sheets. The overall breakdown of calls is
reflected in Table 1 below.

110
“Call Center Statistics 2012 Presidential Election” created and released by the Ohio
Secretary of State’s Office, November 2012. A copy is maintained by the author.
111

These numbers are found on the call line schedule received by the authors in response to
a public records request to the Secretary of State. A copy is maintained by the author.
112

These tally sheets were received by the authors in response to a public records request
of the Secretary’s office. A copy is maintained by the author. No effort is made to determine
the discrepancy between the reported number of 2,669 reported calls and 2,219 calls reflected
on the tally sheets. It seems possible that certain elementary questions were not always
recorded or the reported total number includes individuals who called in but ultimately hung
up. In the end, such a determination is irrelevant to the overall analysis.
113

The authors requested any guidance, manuals, or special training that supported the
hotline work and was referred to the Precinct Election Official Quick Reference Guide for
November 2012, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE (July 2012), available at http://www.sos.state.oh.
us/SOS/Upload/elections/EOresources/peoTraining/PEOFlipchart-2012General.pdf.
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Table 1: Ohio Secretary of State November 2012 Election Day Call Data
Category
Number of Calls
Percentage of Calls
Absentee Ballot
95
4.3%
Registration
588
26.5%
Polling Location
561
25.3%
Fraud Concerns
126
5.7%
Issues, Candidates, etc.
19
0.9%
UOCAVA
34
1.5%
Provisional Ballot
424
19.1%
Campaign Finance
7
0.3%
Other
365
16.4%
Totals
2219
100%114
The three highest categories of registration, polling location, and provisional
ballots are not surprising for a voter line operating on Election Day. Some of the
notes regarding the “other calls” are particularly relevant to concerns regarding
Election Day mistakes. They include calls with notations “forced to vote
prov.[provisional],” “Upset about being asked for ID—or not asked,” and “poll
worker error.”115 Further, there was a notation on a call tallied in the “fraud” section
which stated “observer pulled voter—told to go to old location.”116 Without context
or follow-up it is impossible to assess whether or not these calls reflect actual or
simply perceived errors, but they do highlight the scope of Election Day questions.
ii. Election Protection Call Data
Election Protection is a nonpartisan coalition “formed to ensure that all voters
have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process.”117 Election
Protection runs the nationwide 1-866-OUR-VOTE hotline with the Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. This is a national operation, which includes
local volunteers who are trained and given access to materials to take calls, track
data, and respond to voter concerns leading up to and on Election Day.118 In response
to request from the authors, Election Protection provided a spreadsheet of call
information collected in Ohio during the 2012 election cycle.119 This section
examines the calls received on Election Day.

114

Note: due to rounding, the percentages are not exact, but happened to add up to 100%.

115

“11/6/2012 General Election Tally Sheet” 11/6/2012, Lisa Grotsky (note regarding
forced provisional) “11/6/2012 General Election Call Tally Sheet”, 11/6/2012, Heather Kash
(note regarding identification). “11/6/2012 General Election Call Tally Sheet” 11/6/12 Kathy
Spinelli (note regarding poll worker error). Copies are maintained by the author.
116

“11/6/2012 General Election Call Tally Sheet” 11/6/12 Kathy Spinelli. A copy is
maintained by the author.
117

About Us, ELECTION PROTECTION, http://www.866ourvote.org/about.

118

For more information on Election Protection, administered by the Lawyers’ Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, visit http://www.866ourvote.org.
119

A copy of the spreadsheet is maintained by the author.
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The spreadsheet from Election Protection contains 717 Election Day calls. In
addition to some basic demographic and caller information, the log includes a subset
label and a description. While 123 of the calls had no subset indicated, many of them
also had multiple subsets included. In order to appropriately represent the proportion
of concerns raised by callers, Table 2 below reflects the total number of times a
subset was included with any call record and the percentage of calls that included a
particular subset.
Table 2: Election Protection November 2012 Election Day Ohio Call Data
Subset Label
Number of Mentions
Percentage of Calls
which include subset
Absentee Voting Inquiry
11
1.5%
Absentee Voting Problem

30

4.2%

Accessibility Problem

2

0.3%

Criminal Status Related
Inquiry
Electioneering Problem

7

1.0%

3

0.4%

ID Problem

38

5.3%

None/Other

123

17.2%

Polling Place Inquiry

303

42.3%

Polling Place Problem

52

7.3%

Poll worker Problem

37

5.2%

Provisional Ballot
Concern
Registration Inquiry

42

5.9%

129

18.0%

Registration Problem

48

6.7%

Student Voting Problem

3

0.4%

Voter Intimidation
Problem
Voting Equipment
Problem

16

2.2%

31

4.3%

In addition to the statistical analysis, the description that is included for almost
every call is illustrative of the range of calls and the types of problems that occur.
While a majority of the calls are inquiry based, a significant number raise red flags
indicative of substantial error by poll workers. In one instance, a voter inadvertently
cast an over vote (i.e. the voter selected more than one candidate for a race, but when
the in-precinct scanner gave the option to recast, the poll worker selected “no” on
behalf of the voter. There was a report of ballots being given out without proper
security or verification of registration status. Complaints included poll workers
requiring photo identification. A voter reported being turned away because he had
the same name as his father who had already voted. One voter reported having cast a
regular ballot, but not signing the poll book until she returned later in the day to sign.
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More than one report had voters being sent to multiple potential polling locations. It
is impossible to determine how these reported incidents impacted voters.120
There is also a clear trend in the data that in some cases, voters call in to report
an alleged wrongdoing that actually reflects the voter misunderstanding Ohio law.
More than one caller expressed concern about a passport being rejected as
identification, but that is correct under Ohio’s identification requirement. One report
said voters in a long line were given provisional ballots, but it’s possible that the
precinct was using regular paper ballots in addition to DREs to speed the line as they
are required to do. Election day friction and the perception of voters are regarding
the accuracy and effectiveness of election policy could be improved not only by
better-informed poll workers, but by more aggressive outreach and education of
voters.121
The Election Protection hotline data reveals that while most Election Day calls
were simple inquiries, those that discuss election procedure failures highlight the
significant occurrence of Election Day mistakes.
3. Review of handling of provisional and absentee ballots county by county as it
pertains to Election Day procedure (evidence of voter or poll worker error).
As described in the methodology section above, information was requested from
26 counties. Twenty-five counties responded, and the information was reviewed for
evidence of Election Day errors and to determine some of the good, the bad, and the
ugly of how potential problems are reviewed and resolved. Several important
observations revealed throughout the course of this review are discussed here.
Related recommendations are considered in a later section.
i. Issues at the Polls
There is no formal mechanism in place to capture the reasons why voters were
given provisional ballots in the first place,122 especially when provisional acceptance
rates are very high.123 These high rates may indicate that counties are correctly
steering voters to cast provisional ballots—for example, if they have moved and
have appeared to vote in their new polling location. Alternately, it could be
indicative of counties steering too many voters to provisional ballots when a regular
ballot would have been appropriate in the first place.124 Without more context, there
is no way to definitively understand the vast difference between these two outcomes
by looking at the acceptance rate.

120

These examples are all taken from the Election Protection Ohio spreadsheet, a copy of
which is on file with the author.
121

Id.

122

The formal data collection mechanisms lack a reason for most provisional ballots as will
be highlighted in Part III.D.4, infra.
123

Counties that were very high include: Harrison County, with a provisional acceptance
rate of 97.54%; Putnam County, with a provisional acceptance rate of 95.26%; and Hancock
County, with a provisional acceptance rate of 95.26%. See County Certification and SoS Data,
on file with the author.
124

The review of county records did not reveal instances of an individual being given a
provisional ballot who should have been given a regular ballot.
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Similarly sized counties can vary widely in number of provisional ballots cast.125
In Franklin County where there were 808,578 registered voters for the 2012 general
election (total population 1.19 million, source: 2012 Quickfacts Census) there were
29,840 provisional ballots cast. In slightly more populous Cuyahoga County, where
there were 927,996 registered voters for the 2012 general election (total population
1.27 million, source: Quickfacts Census) there were nearly 3,000 fewer provisional
ballots cast (26,990), amounting to about a 10% difference.126 This variation is
further reflected in the rate of provisional ballots accepted. Franklin County had a
provisional rejection rate of 20.55% whereas Cuyahoga had a provisional rejection
rate of 15.27%.127
There have been numerous efforts to evaluate the overall functionality of
provisional balloting systems including through litigation and this paper does not
attempt to build on them. This effort initially intended to evaluate the role of
Election Day error and make recommendations. That the reason for provisional
ballots being issued is not part of the data collection process highlights what has
become a primary conclusion of the authors: that we need to collect more and better
data. Until such data exists it is difficult to draw further conclusions about any error
rate that may exist in the issuance of provisional ballots.
ii. Issues of Interpretation
For those board minutes where we can read through boards’ discussions on
whether to accept ballots, they are generally consistent in their interpretations, citing
the Secretary of State’s directives and common sense (e.g., Pickaway County
referred to Secretary of State’s directive to address ‘double-bubble’ issue). Further,
where there was a question, as with the Franklin County Board which requested
advice from the Secretary of State to resolve an issue of voters who had signed the
poll book and voted provisionally.128 Boards do not appear to wantonly throw away
125
This problem is not new, by any means. In the November 2006 election, “Ohio’s eightyeight Boards of Elections applied widely different and unequal standards to provisional ballots
cast.” Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 1, NEOCH
v. Brunner, (S.D. Ohio 2008), No. C2-06-896 available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/
electionlaw/litigation/documents/NEOCH-MotionforPI-10-14-08.pdf, at 3. The data from that
election describes significant variation: the average rejection rate of provisional ballots in
Ohio was 18.1%, but the rejection rate varied from 0.85% (Coshocton County) to 43.1%
(Belmont County). Id. at Exhibit C. Five Boards of Elections had a rejection rate of more than
30% and six Boards of Elections had a rejection rate of less than 5%. Twenty-six Boards of
Elections rejected 459 ballots because the voter was determined to be ineligible—Belmont
County Board of Elections rejected 12.4% of its provisional ballots on this basis, while 62
Boards of Elections, including Lucas, Hamilton, Montgomery, and Stark, did not reject any
ballots on this basis. Sixty-four Boards of Elections rejected 2726 provisional ballots because
the voter did not provide the required information.
126

Official Results for 2012 General Election, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.
state.oh.us/sos/upload/elections/2012/gen/FinalResults.xlsx; Provisional Ballot Report for
2012 General Election, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/
elections/2012/gen/provisional.xlsx.
127

Id.

128

Franklin County Meeting Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012, at 33-34 (Decision to make
request of Secretary of State’s office for clarification on proper course of action when the poll
book was signed and a provisional ballot was cast.); Franklin County Meeting Minutes from
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ballots or reject ballots that should clearly be accepted. Most boards act unanimously
in rejecting or accepting ballots. Very few board decisions were or 3-1 and no votes
in the selected counties were 2-2, which would have required a tiebreak by the
Secretary of State.129
iii. Recordkeeping Concerns
County boards’ minutes are often inconsistent regarding the number of ballots
they evaluate and what is reported to the Secretary of State.130 In some instances,
there is a progression over time where county boards only process a certain number
of provisional ballots at each meeting or sometimes more provisional ballots are
found at a later date131 There is also a concern that within board minutes themselves,
sometimes the numbers do not add up correctly.132
With respect to board minutes, the minutes of some counties reported the same
numbers of acceptance and rejections as their later certifications and the resulting

Nov. 21, 2012, at 4-5 (feedback for Secretary of State and decision to exclude ballots). Copies
of both minutes on file with author.
129
Most decisions were unanimous. See, e.g., Wood County Meeting Minutes from Nov.
21, 2012 (all decisions on provisional ballots were made unanimously). In contrast, Hamilton
County had some 3-1 votes. Hamilton County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20,
2012, at 43 (3-1 vote on counting wrong location ballots given to voters during early in-person
voting). There were no tie votes on the counting of provisional ballots submitted to the
Secretary of State. See 2012 Tie Votes, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.oh.
us/SOS/elections/electionsofficials/Rules/2012tievotes.aspx.
130

See, e.g., Franklin County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012, Nov. 21,
2012, and Nov. 26, 2012 (numerous revisions made to the number of ballots in different
categories make it impossible to track final totals through the minutes); Clark County Board
of Elections Meeting Transcript from Nov. 26, 2012, at 94; Monroe County Board of
Elections Minutes from Nov. 19, 2012, at 2. Copies maintained by the author.
131
Franklin County Board of Elections Minutes from Dec. 6, 2012, at 4-5 (33 provisional
ballots were found after certification had been made), at 5-6 (14 paper ballots found after
certification); Cuyahoga County Board of Election Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012 and Nov. 27,
2012. Copies maintained by the author.
132
Cuyahoga County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012 and Nov. 27, 2012;
Franklin County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012, Nov. 21, 2012, and Nov. 26,
2012 (numerous revisions made to the number of ballots in different categories make it
impossible to track final totals through the minutes); Monroe County Board of Elections
Minutes from Nov. 19, 2012, at 1-3 Through correspondence on records between the author
and the Secretary of States office, it was learned that through the formal canvass process and
processing by the Secretary of State for final certification some counts are adjusted or
clarified, but that the counties do not necessarily file updated reports. Record on file with
author. This could explain the discrepancies, but in any case the final official canvass becomes
the count. Although better records are always something to strive for, it would be
contradictory for the authors to simultaneously advocate for recognition and tolerance of error
by voter and poll workers and a knee jerk condemnation of record irregularities. Copies of
relevant documents are on file with the author. See also Provisional Ballot Report for 2012
General Election, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/
Research/electResultsMain/2012Results.aspx.
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Secretary of State’s totals.133 Some county board minutes partially matched their
later certifications and the resulting Secretary of State’s totals.134 Cuyahoga County’s
minutes did not match their later certification or the resulting Secretary of State’s
totals.135 Franklin County’s certification matched the total rejections and acceptances
declared in the Board minutes. However, within the Board minutes themselves, those
totals did not result from adding the subgroups of rejected and accepted provisional
ballots.136
In larger counties, the Boards of Elections tends to vote to accept or reject
provisional and absentee ballots based on staff recommendations and they process
groups of ballots over multiple meetings.137 Several counties included no discussion
of why ballots were rejected in their board minutes,138 whereas other counties
include an exhaustive discussion.139 Other county minutes have groups of ballots
133

Carroll County Board of Elections Special Meeting—Official Canvas Nov. 19, 2012, at
5, Official Certification for Absentee Ballots Nov. 6, 2012, General Election and Official
Certification for Provisional Ballots Nov. 6, 2012; Harrison County Board of Elections
Meeting Minutes Nov. 19, 2012, at 5, Official Certification for Absentee Ballots Nov. 6,
2012; Morgan County Provisional Ballot Certification for Nov. 2012 Election and Minutes
Dec. 3, 2012; Putnam County Board of Elections Minutes Nov. 19, 2012, at 188-89; Vinton
County Board of Elections Minutes Nov. 19, 2012, Certification of Provisional Ballots for the
Nov. 2012 Election. Copies of relevant documents are on file with the author. See also
Provisional Ballot Report for 2012 General Election, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.
sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/Research/electResultsMain/2012Results.aspx.
134
Hancock County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 26, 2012, at 24; Hocking
County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 26, 2012; Pickaway County Board of Elections
Minutes from Nov. 19, 2012, at 3-4. Copies of relevant documents are on file with the author.
135

Cuyahoga County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012 and Nov. 27, 2012.
Copies maintained by the author.
136
Franklin County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012, Nov. 21, 2012, and
Nov. 26, 2012 (numerous revisions made to the number of ballots in different categories make
it impossible to track final totals through the minutes). Copies of relevant documents are on
file with the author.
137
Cuyahoga County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012 and Nov. 27, 2012;
Franklin County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012, Nov. 21, 2012, and Nov. 26,
2012 (numerous revisions made to the number of ballots in different categories make it
impossible to track final totals through the minutes). Copies of relevant documents are on file
with the author.
138

Monroe County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 19, 2012, at 1-2; Morgan
County Board of Elections Provisional Ballot Policy and Board Minutes from Dec. 3, 2012;
Pike County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 20, 2012, at 1; Van Wert County Board of
Elections Minutes from Nov. 21, 2012, at 2; Wood County Board of Elections Minutes from
Nov. 26, 2012; Wyandot County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 21, 2012. Copies of
relevant documents are on file with the author.
139

See, e.g., Carroll County Board of Elections Special Meeting—Official Canvas Nov. 19,
2012, at 2-4; Clark County Board of Elections Meeting Transcript from Nov. 26, 2012, at 1294; Hamilton County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 26, 2012, at 5-15; Pickaway
County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 19, 2012, at 2-4. The detail maintained
significantly increases when a County uses a transcript of the board hearing as minutes rather
than a separate summary document. Copies of relevant documents are on file with the author.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

25

304

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:279

recommended for rejection or acceptance for specific reasons but do not include
totals of provisional ballots accepted or rejected.140
For counties whose minutes do not detail reasons for provisional acceptance or
rejection, there is no indication from any board as to where the data is stored or why
details that emerge in the Secretary of State filings (“certifications”) are not present
in the board minutes themselves. No organized system for cataloging election-day
errors exists in Ohio or on a national level so it is difficult, if not impossible, to
identify common problems that occur in a quantitative or trackable way.141 This
information would be helpful in analyzing recurrent problems and identifying
solutions when the problems do occur (see “Franklin County Data” spreadsheet for a
call log tally and brief description of common problems).
In Carroll County there was an internal policy for precinct officials to call the
Board of Elections prior to issuing a provisional ballot. Some locations did not
follow the policy, resulting in provisional ballots that were not counted due to
“voting in an incorrect precinct/location”142
In general, there was an attempt made to use provisional ballot numbers and
processing information as a proxy for the overall quality of elections in a particular
county and to give evidence of the nature of Election Day errors at the polls. This
review has in fact revealed that our current provisional ballot issuing and evaluation
mechanisms vary county to county and do not provide sufficient indication of the
underlying cause or issue that resulted in a provisional ballot being cast. This Article
does not attempt to determine which boards have the “better” mechanism for ballot
evaluation and recognizes that the needs of boards are likely to differ with
population and number of ballots cast. The significant variation and discrepancy is
relevant on its own face as reflective of the imperfect system which every election
inherently is.
4. Review of incidents recorded either at or through calls from precincts on
Election Day.
In Ohio, all precincts maintain notes or incidents for events occurring at the
polling place on Election Day. There are forms promulgated by the Secretary of
State’s office (Forms 450 and 475) or counties can use their own system. Frequently
there is a separate collection process for machine, poll book, and other Election Day

140
Hancock County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 26, 2012, at 24; Hocking
County Board of Elections Minutes from Nov. 26, 2012. Copies of relevant documents are on
file with the author.
141

New Mexico has made particular headway in this area by explicitly allowing for
academic election observers who can create both reports for election officials and peer
reviewed articles on their findings. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-3.2 (2011). As used in the Election
Code, "election observer" means a person registered with the United States Department of
State as an international election observer or a person registered with the New Mexico
Secretary of State who is an academic engaged in research on elections and the election
process. Id.
142
Carroll County Incident Logs from Nov. 6, 2012; Carroll County Board of Elections
Special Meeting—Official Canvass from Nov. 19, 2012, at 3-4. Copies maintained by the
author.
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problems.143 Through public records requests these documents from the November
2012 election were collected from 24 of the 26 target counties. The volume of
information varied greatly county to county from no incident sheets reported to more
than 2,000 pages of information.144 Review of these documents emphasizes
limitations in the way Election Day information is collected, but also themes of
where errors occur.145 These areas are: general ballot handling, incomplete or
improper offering or processing of provisional ballots, improper voter processing by
poll workers, and mistakes created by voters.
First a note about the records themselves: these are handwritten documents
completed under the pressure and rush of Election Day. The Form 450 asks for
identifying information and the resolution, but there is little guidance for voters and
the form is often incomplete. Entries such as “voter error” occurring in one precinct
five times without further explanation are common and prevent analysis.146 Even
looser are the logs without any prompt to provide a solution or identifying
information and items like Wood County’s general comment page. At times
potentially relevant data is obscured through bad handwriting or poor copy quality.147
These limitations make a quantitative analysis of precinct reports from November
2012 virtually impossible. This is an area where significant improvement could
occur if standardized reporting mechanisms were developed which would balance
the flexibility needed to accommodate the range of election experience against the
desire to have quantifiable reporting.
General ballot handling concerns include reports of what may be either machine
or human error, failure to properly distribute and then recollect paper ballots, and
occasionally provisional ballot control problems. This includes accounting for

143
The Ohio Secretary of State has promulgated Form 450, “Election Day Precinct Event
Log,” for Election Day incidents and Form 475, “Voting Unit Event Log,” for machine error.
Both forms are available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electionsofficials/
forms.aspx. Different counties have created and maintained their own systems. For example,
Wood County has both targeted forms and a general comments section, while Franklin County
has problems and corrections options within the signature poll books and separate event logs
as part of a precinct workbook. The forms for both counties for the November 2012 election
are on file with the author.
144
No incidents were reported by Harrison, Monroe, Morgan, Pickaway, or Putnam
Counties. Copies of the confirming correspondence are on file with the author. Cuyahoga
County supplied a file of more than 2,000 pages of precinct level logs, though that included
blank sheets and some precincts with nothing to report. A copy is maintained by the author.
145
For twenty-one of the twenty-four counties, every record was examined. For Cuyahoga,
Franklin, and Hamilton counties, the volume of records made this impractical and of limited
benefit to the scope of this Article. Applying a list of random numbers (generated by
http://www.random.org) to either the page or stamped indexing numbers of the documents
supplied from the counties, a 10% sample from each county was selected for review.
146

Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #1038 from Cuyahoga County, Precinct
East Cleveland 04 E (Nov. 6, 2012) (on file with the author).
147
See, e.g., Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record # Unknown from Precinct
Sandusky H, Erie County (Nov. 6, 2012) (form cannot be read). A copy is maintained by the
author.
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ballots at the end of the day revealing discrepancies.148 When a ballot-scanning
machine in Cuyahoga County was offline, it was the policy for the poll workers to
collect the ballots and scan them through at the end of the evening or when the
machine came back online and was available.149 In Clark County, among others, a
provisional voter sent his ballot through the scanner and into the ballot box instead
of placing it in the provisional ballot envelope.150 The use of ballot stubs (removable
processing sections of paper ballots) was a source of problems. Provisional ballot
stubs were improperly removed151 and occasionally voters were able to process
regular ballots with stubs when they should have been removed. Certain machines
appear likely to “time out” with notations of such votes being cancelled, but it is
impossible to tell from reports if the ballot was reissued or the voter was ultimately
unable to vote.152
Provisional ballots are a known area of concern and that is reflected in these
reports. Erie County Board of Elections’ decision to institute a call-in approval

148
For example, in Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #181 from Cuyahoga
County, Precinct Brook Park 01 C (Nov. 6, 2012), the final count was missing four ballots.
Similarly, in Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #337 from Cuyahoga County,
Precinct Southeast Seventh Day Adventist (Nov. 6, 2012), a voter in an electric wheelchair
was given a ballot and told to return to the poll worker after completing it for placement in an
envelope (whether a provisional or disability envelope was not mentioned), but the voter left
without turning the ballot in. Copies maintained by the author.
149

See Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #962 from Cuyahoga County, Precinct
Cleveland Heights 03 C (Nov. 6, 2012) (“Ballots from 04E and 03E was mistakenly scanned
in 03C and placed in the gray ballot box until the end of day and scanned the correct precinct
at the end.”). This policy is troubling due to differences in how ballots are considered when
scanned at the precinct compared to those counted at a central location. When a voter scans
her ballot, she has the option to check for over and under votes and make corrections and must
confirm the casting or risk the ballot being canceled as a fleeing voter. In contrast, when the
voter does not scan his own ballot it should be centrally scanned such that over and under
votes can be evaluated for voter intent. Under a current Secretary of State directive and
proposed legislation, when a voter selects but also writes in a candidate, the vote is only
counted if the ballot is centrally processed. The bulk scanning of ballots by poll workers at the
precinct undermines the primary support for the disparate treatment—that the voter could
correct problems with and in-precinct over vote. A copy is maintained by the author.
150

Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record # Unknown from Clark County, Precinct T4
(Nov. 6, 2012) (copy on file with author); see also Election Day Precinct Incident Report
Record #234 from Cuyahoga County, Precinct Cleveland 01 B (Nov. 6, 2012) (voter filled out
provisional ballot but then ran ballot through scanner without knowledge of workers); see also
Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #220 from Cuyahoga County, Luis Munoz Marin
Middle School (Nov. 6, 2012) (machine accepted such a ballot).
151

See, e.g., Election Day Precinct Incident Logs from Carroll County, Lou Township
Harlem Springs (Nov. 6, 2012) (copy on file with author) (reported a judge tearing off the
stubs and as correction placing them in the envelope with the ballot); Election Day Incident
Log Record #167 from Cuyahoga County (Nov. 6, 2012) (stubs were removed before sealing
of a provisional ballot, stubs sealed with ballot); Election Day Incident Log from Hamilton
County, Precinct Cincinnati 4-G (Nov. 6, 2012) (voter scanned a provisional ballot).
152

See, e.g., Election Day Precinct Incident Log from Carroll County, Precinct Carr B
(Nov. 6, 2012) (copy on file with author) (“Machine Time Out Vote Cancelled.”).
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requirement was highly problematic based on these reports.153 The call in system
failed to alleviate disparate treatment of voters as in one precinct a voter with a
different name in the book than what she offered verbally and on her identification
was permitted to vote a regular ballot with another precinct where a voter who had a
middle name listed on his drivers license but not in the poll book was required to
cast a provisional ballot.154 In many cases there is enough information to conclude a
provisional ballot should have been offered, but no assurance that it was. In a
Franklin County Precinct, the poll workers report finding a name in the supplemental
poll book after the voter already voted provisionally,155 this voter should have voted
a regular ballot, but was at risk of disenfranchisement if there is a technical error in
his provisional ballot form. Though many of the reports reflect a problem in
processing a provisional vote;156 there are also notations where a regular ballot was
cast which should have been provisional.157 There are also discrepancies between
153

This policy was adopted by Erie County based on the incident reports in addition to
Carroll County discussed in the provisional balloting section. Numerous precincts have
incidents that reflect long wait times for provisional ballots, voters leaving without casting a
ballot, and general problems in reaching the Board of Elections for approval. Even more
problematic, the approval process included a search for the voter’s registration information.
Thought not clear, it appears that if the Board reported a voter as not registered, he or she was
not given a provisional ballot. Such on-demand registration evaluation undercuts the purpose
of provisional ballots, which are to protect voters who are not listed in a poll book, but assert
their eligibility to vote. The entire Erie County incident file is illustrative of this problem. A
copy is on file with the author.
154
Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record Mar #1 from Erie County, Precinct Martin
P4 (Nov. 6, 2012) (copies on file with author).
155

LID #5005 from Franklin County, Precinct I-L Zone #1 (Nov. 6, 2012). A copy is
maintained by the author.
156

See, e.g., Provisional Pink Memo 4-P from Cuyahoga County, Addison Square
Apartments (Nov. 6, 2012) (“wrong date, voter putting address in wrong place, missing ballot
number”). These types of flaws on the provisional ballot form could easily result in a vote
being rejected even if the voter is otherwise qualified. See also Provisional Notes from
Hamilton County, Cincinnati Anderson CC (Nov. 6, 2012) (three voters were instructed to
sign the wrong side of the provisional envelope and the error was called into the Board);
Provisional Pink Memo 73-P from Cuyahoga County, Cleveland Korean Presb. Church (Nov.
6, 2012) (a number of voters are referenced as “not signing” but it is unclear if this refers to
the provisional log, which is a county level accounting mechanism, or the provisional
envelope, where a lack of signature will result in the vote being rejected); LID #2152 from
Franklin County, Precinct Workbook Zone #2 Saint Stephen’s Community House (Nov. 6,
2012) (judge used handicapped rather than provisional envelopes for paper ballots for the first
three hours of the—it is unclear how these errors would impact the ultimate counting of the
votes, but it would result in voter accounting discrepancies as handicapped voters do sign the
poll book whereas provisional voters do not). Copies are maintained by the author.
157

Election Day Precinct Incident Log from Carroll County, Augusta Precinct (Nov. 6,
2012) (“[Name withheld from publication] voted electronic should have been prov.” Why the
vote should have been provisional is not included); see also Election Day Precinct Incident
Log Record #380 from Cuyahoga County, Cleveland 04M (Nov. 6, 2012) (“should have voted
Absentee He voted regular ballot”); Provisional Notes from Hamilton County, Cincinnati
Anderson A (Nov. 6, 2012) (discovered at the end of the day that a voter listed as having
received an absentee ballot voted a regular ballot); Form 450 from Hamilton County,
Cincinnati 13D (Nov. 6, 2012) (through misreading of instructions five voters were given a
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precincts and counties on when a provisional ballot is required. An apparent typo in
a name or address could result in either a voter receiving a regular or provisional
ballot depending on the county or precinct in which a voter resided.158 In one case a
voter with a name change was able to cast a regular ballot by showing a marriage
license as an additional form of identification.159 Though ultimately an election that
requires fewer provisional ballots would be ideal, limiting—on Election Day—
access to provisional ballots when a regular ballot is impermissible undermines the
last line of defense for voters who without access to a provisional ballot would be
wrongly disenfranchised.
There is some evidence of poll worker mistake in generally applying the
standards or guiding voters. Depending on the circumstances seemingly harmless
error, such as a board rover insisting only black pens are used can cause delay and
confusion, such as when only blue pens are provided.160 Some errors don’t affect a
voter’s ballot access on Election Day, but could complicate audits if there is a future
problem.161 Concerns poll workers share represent broader logistical hurdles, such as
when a cell phone will not work within a polling location so a poll worker must go
to the sidewalk to call in an issue.162 One report showed a fundamental
misunderstanding, at least at first, of the importance of the poll book when a poll
regular ballot who should have voted provisionally, attempts to call the Board for resolution
were made but it was difficult to get through). Copies maintained by the author.
158

See, e.g., LID #2114 Problems and Correction Section O-Z, 1 from Franklin County
(Nov. 6, 2012) “BOE mistyped first name ‘Mark’ and ‘Mary’—voted as regular voter on
machine—please correct name showed voter card from BOE with ‘Mary’ + proper ID with
Mark & correct address.”); cf. Notes from Hamilton County, Precinct Cincinnati 5-G (Nov. 6,
2012) (“[V]oter name is misspelled (one letter typo) voted provisionally because name in
wrong alphabetical location was not seen.” In the same precinct a voter on the supplemental
list voted provisionally.). Copies maintained by the author.
159
Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #37 from Cuyahoga County, Beachwood
Ward 00 Precinct G (Nov. 6, 2012). A voter with a different last name from the poll book
voted a regular ballot by showing a marriage license with the changed name. In the same
precinct, a voter who was not in the poll book, but was on the lists of names and addresses that
are periodically posted was permitted to vote a regular ballot. This precinct took a very voteroriented approach that used available information and not a strict adherence to procedure in
determining whether a voter should have a provisional or regular ballot. A copy is maintained
by the author.
160
Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #51 from Cuyahoga County, Bedford 02B
(Nov. 6, 2012) (Blue or black ink can be read by the optical scanning equipment.). A copy is
maintained by the author.
161

See Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #13J from Cuyahoga County (Nov. 6,
2012) (“five ballot numbers forgetting to be written down”); Election Day Precinct Incident
Log Record #1507 from Cuyahoga County, North Olmstead 03 G (Nov. 6, 2012) (“We were
so busy—stub numbers before 60 were not recorded, 1 person short at our table.”); see also
LID #1211 from Franklin County, Precinct Workbook Zone #1 Columbus Firehouse Number
Thirty One (Nov. 6, 2012) (“the morning balancing was difficult due to failure to maintain
separate tally and mixing of old and new authority to vote slips, high volume of voters
contributed.”). Copies maintained by the author.
162

Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record # 349 from Cuyahoga County, Cleveland
03S (Nov. 6, 2012). A copy is maintained by the author.
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worker had two voters who were not in the book just sign at the bottom of the page
before being corrected by another worker.163 Some reports reflect trouble with
interaction between poll workers,164 which would certainly hinder the Election Day
process and reduce voter confidence. These items, in addition to the poll workers’
actions regarding ballot handling and provisional processing reflect the complex job
facing precinct level election administrators especially given frequent election law
changes, long hours, and the inexperience of workers and voters.
Finally, though not as common as some other themes, the reports do reflect errors
by voters of varying degrees of severity. This can be as simple as a voter signing on
the wrong line165 to as severe as someone who has moved providing and voting as if
they still lived at the prior address.166 Some reports show voters who escalate conflict
with poll workers for a perceived or actual problem.167 These mistakes by voters add
to potential post-election verification problems and increase the administrative
burden on poll workers. Further, open conflicts between voters and poll workers
hinder the voting process and reduce confidence for everyone.
163
Election Day Precinct Incident Log from Erie County, Pert #4 (Nov. 6, 2012). A copy is
maintained by the author.
164

Notes from Hamilton County, Cincinnati, Delhi B (November 6, 2012) (Reflects
repeated attempts to contact the Board of Elections and a concern that the presiding judge was
over-reliant on the Board given the long wait times. The presiding judge is reported to have
said in response to this concern, “I worked the polls for 30 years and I am calling the BOE.”);
Election Day Precinct Incident Log from Hamilton County, Cincinnati 26-E (Nov. 6, 2012)
(Included a long narrative regarding conflict between the poll workers including, for example,
one poll worker misapplying the identification standard. The presiding judge referred to
general chaos and “getting cursed out at least 3 times.”). Copies are maintained by the author.
165

This happens and is reported quite frequently. For example, in a precinct with a linked
signature and voting system, a woman voted as her husband due to poll worker error, but it
was subsequently adjusted when the husband voted as his wife. Election Day Precinct Incident
Log from Richland County, Mad A, McElroy Church of Christ (November 6, 2012) (copy on
file with author); see also Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record #167 from Cuyahoga
County, Broadview Heights 03 D (Nov. 6, 2012); Election Day Precinct Incident Log Record
#171 from Cuyahoga County, Broadview Heights 04B (Nov. 6, 2012); LID# 1069 from
Franklin County, Zone #2 A-K (Nov. 6, 2012). Copies maintained by the author.
166
See, e.g., Election Day Precinct Incident Log from Clark County, Mfld-7 Northridge
UMC (Nov. 6, 2012) (voter voted as registered, but subsequently when his wife came to vote
it was discovered they had moved and he should have gone to the new precinct). It should be
noted this type of incident is the type of voter error that some would call “fraud,” but for the
purposes of this Article unless intent of voter fraud can be discerned from available records
such actions will be considered mistakes. A copy is maintained by the author.
167
See Election Day Precinct Incident Log form Hamilton County, Symmes F (Nov. 6,
2012) (voter ultimately cast a ballot, but had conflict with poll workers on presenting the
proper form of ID and not being asked for an alternative). The report reflects the voter was
told “could not vote.” See also Election Day Precinct Incident Log from Hamilton County,
Sycamore N (Nov. 6, 2012) (Voter with a registration card was not found in the poll book and
angrily refused to vote provisionally. Voter left but upon return after a long hold with the
Board of Elections the voter was found in the supplemental list. The voter loudly demanded
apologies and was angry throughout the interaction.). In these examples, though the poll
worker committed error in processing the voter, the action of the voters hindered resolution of
the issue. Copies are maintained by the author.
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Through evaluating precinct incident logs a picture emerges of what can happen
in a precinct on Election Day. These reports highlight the near infinite number of
variables that are part of any election. They also make clear that ultimately elections
are run by fallible people whose judgment will inevitably affect the voting rights of
some of the voters they serve on any given day. Steps should be taken to both
improve this data and to adapt elections systems to guide poll workers toward voterfavored decision making.
III. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Collect and use better data for Election Day functionality168 with a goal of
creating real time Due Process protection for Election Day concerns.
As the research and writing for this piece occurred, it became clear little
scholarly work has focused on Election Day problems themselves because the
evidence available is piecemeal and too often anecdotal. By focusing on Ohio, we
were able to create a limited scope that made data collection a still difficult but
achievable goal. Somewhat ironically, we were also aided by the volume of litigation
and attention that has been paid to Ohio’s election process. Though the cases169 focus
on the counting of provisional ballots utilize a fault based framework that this
research shows could be problematic, the evidence collected is incredibly valuable in
understanding Election Day functionality.
This conclusion is also reflected in “The American Voting Experience: Report
and Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Election Administration”
January 2014.170 The report focuses a great deal on the need for better planning,
preparation, and use of customer services and engineering practices in managing
elections. The report does reflect that part of why Election Day itself cannot be better
managed is due to a lack of data. “Despite the fact that elections drown in data, and
political campaigns have transformed American politics by gathering and analyzing
data about their supporters, election administration has largely escaped this data
revolution.”171 In its recommendation the Commission advised collection and
reporting of “transaction data” in order to improve the “voter experience.”172 This
Article’s examination of available information even at a transactional level supports
this conclusion.
It is therefore critical to find a mechanism to better capture both the perceived
and actual functioning of polling places on Election Day. The work of groups like
168
For the purpose of this Article, Election Day functionality would reflect the highest
percentage of voters being efficiently and correctly processed in a manner that allows for
after-the-fact verification that decisions on regular versus provisional ballots and counting
versus rejecting those provisional ballots was correct.
169
NEOCH v. Husted, No. 12-4354, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26926 (6th Cir. Nov. 16,
2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ca6-12-04354; SEIU v.
Husted, 698 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 2012).
170

PRESIDENTIAL COMM. ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING EXPERIENCE:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION
ADMINISTRATION 68 (Jan. 2014), available at https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2014/01/
Amer-Voting-Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf.
171

Id.

172

Id.
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Election Protection and calls staffed by governmental and non-governmental entities
is valuable but is too small scale and lacks routine follow up and analysis. In
addition, reliance on call center data too heavily will skew any result towards areas
or issues where people report problems while unfairly ignoring the many precincts
and elections where there are minimal if any concerns or reports. On the other hand,
in order for a problem to be reported someone—an observer, a voter, or a poll
worker—must recognize it as a problem. The call logs reveal a lack of understanding
of what is or is not permitted in Ohio law. A voter who fails to properly sign a
provisional ballot will be unknowingly disenfranchised. In contrast, complaints of
rejection of the use of a passport as identification misunderstand that a passport is
not considered proper identification under Ohio law.
The volume of reports and the increased awareness of the potential for Election
Day problems could and should be harnessed to improve both the actual and
perceived functioning of elections. Poll workers should be encouraged to discuss any
concern with voters. The incident reports include notations of voters who left
without casting a provisional ballot who could have become frustrated with the
process. Voters who become angry with poll workers could also be aided by a more
open dialogue process. This combined with the high number of calls to the Secretary
of State and Election Protection officials reflect an increasingly engaged yet wary
voter mentality. If voters understand why something has been done it will improve
their confidence in the outcome. Simultaneously, precinct officials who explain and
discuss their actions will deepen their own understanding of the requirements
allowing for goal oriented rather than technocratic application of Election Day
procedures. Voters should be empowered to ask necessary questions and have a
mechanism to report both what works and what doesn’t work about their election
experience.
Too much of our understanding of what might go wrong at a polling place on
Election Day stems from litigation where review of the facts occurs only in a highly
charged and adversarial process. It is impossible to remedy wrongs when there is
limited unbiased data to improve a complex electoral system. The goal of such
improvement would be to minimize any unnecessary provisional ballots and ensure
that Election Day error does not result in actual disenfranchisement, perceived
disenfranchisement, or a lack of confidence in the election result.173 This could
ultimately narrow the litigation margin and reduce the reliance on litigation to adjust
electoral standards.
B. Ohio should manage elections and related disputes through legislative adoption
of policies incorporating the materiality principle and the Democracy Canon.
The Ohio General Assembly, as with other state legislative bodies, is in a unique
position to bring alive a principled approach to mistake and ambiguity in ways that
would facilitate elections and minimize the need for continuous administrative and
judicial interpretations of election laws. The 2012 election and the litigation that has
173

Reducing the number of unnecessary provisional ballots should not be achieved by
limiting provisional ballot access for voters who are unable to cast a regular ballot—any such
attempt undermines the very purpose of provisional ballots. Counties that had a call-in policy
for provisional ballot access should reevaluate such requirements as it was a drain on
resources and negates the opportunity for the post-election analysis provisional ballots were
intended to allow.
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been continuing in Ohio for years highlight the impossibility of creating an election
system sufficiently detailed to avoid any gaps. However, inclusion in election code
at a state level language like the materiality protection in the Civil Rights Act and a
catchall standard that ambiguities should be decided in favor of voters will anticipate
and guide unexpected election concerns. Existing statutes and standards should be
evaluated and reformed in response to existing federal law on materiality and the
need for a guiding principle.
By necessity, all election systems will rely upon the actions of millions of
individuals for the offering, casting, collection, and counting of ballots. As is
reflected in the pleadings, public data, and hotline reports, the potential for mistakes
to be made by voters or election officials operating in good faith with the best of
intentions are inevitable. Thankfully, the Anderson/Burdick standard does not require
overly technical or rigid responses to such errors, but looks to balance the reality of
election regulation against the experience of human operators.174 Though designed
for analysis of election schemes in a litigation framework both the materiality
principle and Democracy Canon can provide guidance for needed flexibility to
promote rather than endanger fairness and electoral confidence.
The Materiality Principle and the Democracy Canon should be immediately
incorporated into judicial analysis of election disputes in Ohio. The Ohio General
Assembly needs to include these analytical approaches as bedrock principles by
enacting the Anderson/Burdick balancing standard in statutory regulation of
elections. This should include, at minimum, instruction to consider errors based on
whether or not they matter rather than through a fault-based analysis that has so
often been used in Ohio.175 This could be especially beneficial in provisional
balloting standards: if it was part of the record why a provisional ballot was offered,
it could be determined that a voter should have had a regular ballot at which point
any analysis should cease and the vote should be counted. This type of evaluation
better balances the rights and obligations of provisional voters against those who
perhaps should have been provisional voters but erroneously cast a regular ballot.
This standard should be taught and emphasized at every level of election
administration to facilitate the goal of counting ballots in contrast to the current
overly process-oriented election procedures.
The materiality principle is at its core a reasonableness doctrine, applying a
reasonable person standard to election discrepancies. This can be the beginning, but
cannot be the end, of guidance for voters and election officials, as there still needs to
be a guiding principle over areas where reasonable minds could differ. That principle
can and should be taken from the Democracy Canon: ambiguities should be decided
in favor of the voter. If this balanced standard was then embraced by legislative
entities, it could serve as a safety net within existing election regulation—a guided
reasonableness requirement for when human error or unforeseen circumstances
require the exercise of judgment on Election Day.
Through such a process the need for pre- and post-election litigation could be
minimized, but even when required such litigation would have stronger backing in
the representative process. Ohio could and should legislatively create a pre174

See supra notes 53-61.

175

See generally NEOCH v. Husted, No. 12-4354, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26926 (6th Cir.
Nov. 16, 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ca6-12-04354; SEIU
v. Husted, 698 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 2012).
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determined standard for how to balance the competing interests of voters and the
state. Such a standard recognizing the role of mistake and requiring ambiguities be
decided in favor of voters would guide election officials, from the Secretary of State
down to each poll worker, and as needed guide judges to decide election disputes on
principles from within rather than beyond Ohio law.
C. The Election Assistance Commission and federal support for election review and
analysis are strongly recommended.
The need for better data collection and analysis cannot be met without federal
support both on a policy and monetary level. The Federal Elections Assistance
Commission, which is currently without any commissioners,176 was established as a
clearinghouse for information and best practices. As states pursue divergent
solutions to evolving electoral systems challenges, an ability to comparatively
evaluate their experiences is needed for continued improvement in election systems.
Further, the EAC could evaluate and certify voting equipment to the states which
would free up additional state resources.177
There also needs to be federal support for maintenance of voting machines under
requirements enacted as part of the Help America Vote Act. Even if Ohio wished to
invest in better poll worker training and data collection, it would be difficult to do so
given the financial burden aging voting machines place on state and local
resources.178 Since current voting machines were purchased for use at the same time
to meet federal requirements, Ohio, along with other states faces a significant
financial burden to repair and replace the equipment which is all aging out at the
same time.
At both a state and federal level an investment is needed, not just in the physical
mechanics of voting, but in pursuing an understanding of what is and is not working
in modern election systems. This is especially true of an understanding of the events
of Election Day at a polling place level where systematic study has not occurred. If
fully functional, the EAC could recommend best practices for Election Day
monitoring and evaluation from which to build future investment. Significant data
collection and investment in analysis of that data is necessary to develop a
quantitative and statistically significant understanding of the Election Day
experience of voters and election officials alike.
IV. CONCLUSION
Analyzing the administration of the 2012 General Election in Ohio with the
background of other recent elections shows that both luck and margins of victory
were as responsible as election administration for avoidance of electoral meltdown.
176
The commission is not entirely defunct, though it lacks commissioners. See
Commissioners, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, http://www.eac.gov/about_the_eac/
commissioners.aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 2014). It still maintains some staff that continue the
mission of the EAC as authorized. See Dan Tokaji, The EAC Marches On, ELECTION LAW
BLOG, http://electionlawblog.org/?p=54056 (Aug. 7, 2013).
177

The Presidential Commission reached similar conclusions. PRESIDENTIAL COMM. ON
ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING EXPERIENCE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 64-65 (Jan. 2014).
178

Id. at 62-63; see also Barry M. Horstman, Husted Makes Case for Funding Ohio Voting
Machines, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, (Dec. 11, 2012).
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As a state, Ohio is woefully unprepared for increased scrutiny of its practices,
particularly within the context of a judicial intervention in an election. Ohio has
ignored the existence of simple human error when crafting its laws and standards.
The most straightforward requirement is the need to collect better information of
what happens on Election Day. Through examining litigation documents and public
records, it is evident that record keeping is deficient, at best. From the individual poll
worker through to the Secretary of State, records collection and retention must be
improved. In order to truly understand and address systemic problems, better data is
needed to quantify the experience of voters and election officials.
The laws of the state of Ohio must recognize that perfection is impossible in
elections administration and error exists without malicious intent. A principled
approach to election administration where ambiguity should be resolved for the voter
can fill gaps in the law as it is impossible to legislate every aspect of the millions of
individual actions which go in to each election. Voter error is not voter fraud, poll
worker error is not intended to be voter suppression, but both can have such effects
when election officials are not empowered to use common sense in furtherance and
protection of the most fundamental right to vote.
In any system within which humans interact, there will always be a degree of
error. Currently, the only effective remediation is pre- and post-election litigation.
This is unacceptable.
By implementing a system that only invalidates ballots for material error, that
accepts substantial or constructive compliance of completed ballots and uses the
Democracy Canon to guide pre- and post-election litigation and administrative
remedies, we would create a system that is far superior to current law, respects each
voter’s intention, and reveres each individual vote. Perfection is not an option for
election administration, but common sense reforms and voter-oriented principles can
make Election Day perfectly reasonable and most importantly, fair.
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